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This paper discusses the link between the deficit bias in public finance and institutional settings. 
The Polish experience is put in a wider context and provides an extensive discussion of possible 
institutional reforms that may be implemented to stabilise the path of fiscal policy and reduce the 
deficit bias. Although substantial improvements have been made in Poland with respect to fiscal 
transparency standards set by the IMF and EU there is still much scope for enhancement. The 
recommended  change  in  fiscal  policy  would  involve  the  implementation  of  medium-term 
budgetary  framework  that  would  ensure  consistency  between  the  budgetary  process  and 
medium-term fiscal goals. This should be accompanied by the introduction of binding constraints 
on fiscal policy. The expenditure rule could be reintroduced to strengthen fiscal discipline, as it 
could force policymakers to tighten fiscal policy. It seems to be indispensable to maintain fiscal 
rules  at  the  local  government  level.  The  issue  of  still  limited  fiscal  transparency  and 
unsatisfactory  performance  of  fiscal  rules  requires  the  undertaking  of  various  appropriate 
measures  to  strengthen  the  policy  framework  in  Poland.  This  can  be  done  in  our  view  by 
involving external institution entitled to examine fiscal transparency and the performance of fiscal 
rules in the budgetary process. We think that the institution that is fully capable to take the lead 
in this respect is the NIK, which was granted full independence in 1994 and has since proved to 
be  successful  in  overseeing  public  finances.  This  should,  however,  be  accompanied  by 
simultaneous enhancement of the internal audit. 
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Transparency  and  fiscal  rules  can  be  of  great  help  in  reducing  the  deficit  bias.  The 
importance of fiscal transparency is highly appreciated by such international organisations as 
the IMF, which has published Codes of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (1998) and the 
OECD, with its Best Practices for Budget Transparency (2000). They have also been explicitly 
formulated  by  the  European  Union  in  the  acquis  communautaire.  All  these  organisations 
emphasise the role of fiscal transparency as a precondition for fiscal sustainability and good 
governance. Transparency is commonly supplemented by fiscal rules that are implemented to 
inject or restore credibility. They have been introduced as binding constraints by the EU in the 
form  of  the Maastricht criteria and  the Stability  and  Growth  Pact. However, in  order to fully 
benefit  from  such  rules  fiscal  policy  has  to  be  transparent,  as  this  obliges  policymakers  to 
become more accountable. 
Poland has made some efforts to make its fiscal policy more transparent over the last 
few years mainly in order to comply with EU and IMF regulations. This has been accompanied 
by the introduction of some binding constraints on fiscal policy that are required by the EU. 
However, there still seems to be a long way to go in both respects. The main purpose of this 
study is to assess the current stance and desirable progress in the implementation of fiscal 
transparency and rules in Poland. An index of transparency based on Report on the Observance 
of Standards and Codes (ROSC), with some modifications, is also constructed in this paper, 
followed by proposals for making transparency and fiscal rules more efficient within Poland’s 
fiscal policy. This study attempts to answer the following questions: Firstly, to what extent is 
fiscal policy transparent in the context of the standards set by the EU’s regulations and the IMF’s 
ROSC?  Secondly,  have  the  fiscal  rules  adopted  by  Poland  proved  to  be  successful  in 
establishing  fiscal  policy  discipline?  Finally,  what  still  needs  to  be  changed  to  make  both 
transparency and fiscal rules more efficient for the conduct of fiscal policy? To set the work in 
context we also provide an overview of recent advances in both the theoretical and empirical 
literature on fiscal transparency and rules. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
 









1.  Theoretical and empirical background 
 
The literature on fiscal rules has been widely addressed in recent years in particular with 
regards to transparency. Langenus (2001) argues, for example, that apart from rules specifying 
quantitative targets for fiscal policy it is also equally important to set qualitative targets, to make 
more precise the procedural issues affecting fiscal policy. Transparency as such clearly plays a 
special role in terms of monitoring both numerical and procedural targets. 
1.1. Transparency in fiscal policy 
 
Fiscal transparency can be defined as the government and financial authorities more 
widely being open about the structure and functions of their operations, fiscal policy intentions, 
public  sector  accounts  and  fiscal  projections  (Kopits  and  Craig,  1998).  Such  openness  is 
essential if discipline is to be imposed on governments and policymakers made accountable for 
the  design  and  implementation  of  fiscal  policy.  Transparency  should  lead  to  better,  more 
credible policies, to a less uncertain policy environment, to earlier and smoother fiscal policy 
responses to emerging economic problems and ultimately to improved economic performance. 
According  to  Kopits  and  Szekely  (2002)  and  Feldman  and  Watson  (2002),  the  key 
transparency objective is an open multi-year budget framework. They claim that the adoption of 
a medium-term budget framework, alongside structural reforms, is very important in the context 
of EU accession. The second transparency objective is consolidation of the budget across all 
areas of fiscal activity, such as off-budget operations. This may include extra-budgetary funds, 
contingent liabilities and the balances of state owned financial and non-financial enterprises. The 
third important transparency objective is to achieve a sound accounting system consistent with 
the European System of Accounts (ESA 95) and the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual 
(GFSM 2001). An integral part of the issues here is having an external audit that can enhance 
and  strengthen  internal  controls.  The  fourth  objective  is  to  clearly  define  relations  among 
different levels of government, including reporting practices at the sub-national level. 
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A high degree of fiscal transparency is most commonly associated with benefits in the 
form  of  greater  fiscal  discipline  (Alesina  et  al.,  1999)  and  more  accountable  fiscal  policy 
(Hemming and Kell, 2001). Other benefits are related to the reduction of uncertainty over fiscal 
policy  as  well  as  faster  and  smoother  fiscal  policy  response to  any  shocks  that  may  hit  an 
economy. 
 
1.1.1. Theoretical background 
 
There  is  an  extensive  literature  outlining  theoretical  models  on  the  political  and 
institutional aspects of fiscal policy. This framework encompasses the interaction between the 
political and economic dimensions of fiscal policy and in large part also attempts to reconcile 
them (Alesina and Perotti, 1995). Apart from economic variables, such as average growth or 
initial level of debt, affecting fiscal performance independent political variables such as political 
polarisation, government structure and electoral systems (Persson and Tabellini, 1995) are also 
key. 
The theoretical literature on the implications of fiscal transparency is not large, however. 
Several strong sources stand out: the asymmetric information models of fiscal policy developed 
by  Rogoff  (1990)  and  the  contributions  of  Easterly  (1999),  who  adapt  the  Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model to analyse the consequences of creative accounting practices related to the 
Maastricht  Treaty.  In  a  similar  spirit  to  Easterly’s  approach, Milesi-Ferretti  (2004)  propose  a 
model in which the impact of fiscal transparency on government debt is considered, allowing for 
creative  accounting  practices  under  a  fiscal  policy  rules  regime.  The  author  concludes  that 
transparency  determines  the  scope  for  creative  accounting,  as  opposed  to  real  fiscal 
adjustment, and emphasises the role of fiscal rules in this context. Shi and Svensson (2002) 
present a political agency model in which politicians attempt to appear competent by issuing 
debt and thus providing more public goods. This of course only postpones payment to future 
periods. In their model, the degree of fiscal or budgetary transparency determines when and 
how far voters can observe debt, and thus the extent to which an incumbent can use debt to 
appear competent. Alt and Lassem (2003) extend this model to political parties with preferences 
over  public  spending.  The  first  outcome  suggests  that  transparency  diminishes  debt 
accumulation  partly  due  to  the  electoral  cycle, which  is  consistent  with  Shi  and  Svensson’s 
model.  Alt  and  Lassem  also  find  that  increasing  political  polarisation  increases  debt 
accumulation (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990) and confirm the model proposed by Persson and 
Svensson (1989), which suggests that right-wing governments tend to have higher deficits than Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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left-wing governments. An interesting approach is developed by Ferejohn (1999), who examines 
an agency model in which transparency affects voter trust in government and thus the size of 
government.  The  common  feature  of  all  approaches  is  that  transparency  is  associated  with 
higher probability or accuracy of observations of incumbents’ performance. 
1.1.2. Empirical research 
 
The empirical research on fiscal transparency is also limited. Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
note that the “results on transparency probably say more about the difficulty of measuring it than 
about  its  effect  on  fiscal  discipline”.  This  is  reiterated  by  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1999)  and 
subsequently by Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000).  
One  strand  of  the  empirical  literature  constructs  an  index  that  measures  different 
dimensions of fiscal transparency. Von Hagen (1992) compiles a transparency index for eight 
European  countries  that  measures  whether  they  have  special  funds,  if  their  budgets  are 
submitted in a single document, assesses transparency by respondents, whether there is a link 
to national accounts and whether loans to non-governmental entities are included. This index 
has been partially updated by de Haan et al. (1999). Guerrero et al. (2001) provide an index of 
budget transparency for five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. 
The  index  measures  in  a  comparable  form  the  degree  of  accessibility  and  utility  of  the 
information  provided  by  national  governments  with  respect  to  finances,  revenues  and 
expenditures. The authors find that all the analysed countries lacked budget transparency and 
the index takes values between 3.7 and 5.9, on a scale with the maximum score of 10. This is 
complemented by a detailed analysis by a group of experts of the legal frameworks within which 
budgetary processes take place in each country. A more descriptive approach is employed by 
Allan and Perry (2003), who analyse fiscal transparency in EU accession countries. They use 
the IMF’s ROSC to assess the current stance of fiscal transparency in the economies of the new 
member states. The paper highlights four areas that should be enhanced in terms of budgetary 
practices. Principally, it suggests that medium-term budget frameworks to help increase fiscal 
policy credibility need to be established. The others include comprehensive coverage of off-
budget activities in conjunction with strengthening and modernising governments’ accounting 
and  reporting  systems. There  is  also  a need  to  develop  uniform reporting  standards for  the 
broadly defined general government as well as improve the management capacity at the sub-
national governmental level.  
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Another strand of empirical research has been initiated by Alt, Lassen, and Skilling (2002). They 
compile  an  index  of  fiscal  transparency  for  the  US  and  test  empirically  the  influence  of 
transparency  on  the  scale  of  government  and  gubernatorial  popularity.  This  methodology  is 
followed by Alt and Lassen (2003), who provide an index of transparency for OECD countries 
examining the relationship between fiscal transparency and public debt and deficits. The basis 
for compiling the index is the OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparency (OECD, 2001). Its 
results confirm the hypothesis that transparency impacts positively on fiscal performance in 19 
OECD  countries,  even  after  factoring  into  the  equation  issues  such  as  partisanship  and 
polarisation. The authors also check for endogeneity problems, as anecdotal accounts of fiscal 
performance  suggest  that  improvements  in  fiscal  transparency  are  often  part  of  a  fiscal 
consolidation package. Thus, governments that are keen on fiscal discipline may be more willing 
to establish transparent fiscal procedure. 
 
1.2. Fiscal policy rules 
 
Fiscal policy rules can be defined as constraints, expressed in terms of an indicator of 
fiscal performance, imposed on fiscal policy (Kopits and Symansky, 1998). A broader definition 
of fiscal policy rules is applied by Hemming and Kell (2001), who also include, apart from certain 
targets for fiscal variables, various procedural rules that ensure the execution of fiscal policy.  
The main objective in designing an economic policy based on such rules is to gain trust 
by ensuring that fundamentals are predictable and robust. This should apply to any government 
in office (Kopits, 2001). Hemming and Kell (2001) claim that there are essentially two principal 
arguments in favour of introducing fiscal policy rules. Firstly, rules can reduce deficit bias by 
strengthening the credibility of the fiscal authorities. Secondly, rules can also impose restrictions 
on deficits at the intra-national level, helping to avoid transmitting negative effects of fiscal policy 
loosening to the higher level or other jurisdictions. 
 
1.2.1. Deficit rules 
 
A deficit rule can be defined as a constraint imposed on a budget deficit to be fulfilled 
over a predefined period of time. The measure of the fiscal position is commonly specified as the 
general government deficit, and the period of time to which the rule is binding can be annual 
targets and/or the medium-term perspective. 
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There  is  a  problem  related  to  the  inflexibility  of  rules,  however  (Alesina  and  Perotti, 
1999). More specifically, the rules are of a pro-cyclical character, as they are inconsistent with 
the stabilising role of fiscal policy. A solution to this dilemma is to set the time framework for the 
operation  of  deficit  rules  over  the  cycle,  as  opposed  to  setting  annual  targets.  This  allows 
automatic  stabilisers  to  work  and  leaves  some  space for  discretionary  policy,  which  should, 
however, be offset over the cycle. In this context, the issue of a trade-off between credibility and 
flexibility  arises  (Hemming  and  Kell,  2001).  This  stems  from  the  fact  that  allowing  for 
discretionary fiscal policy results in increased flexibility, but at the same time makes the target 
less precise, this lowering credibility. 
Setting  a  rule  over  the  cycle  necessitates,  therefore,  first  defining  the  cycle.  This  is 
because fiscal policy should be designed on the basis of the cyclical character of the economy. 
Hemming and Kell (2001) argue that there is a risk related to the end of the cycle because it is 
very difficult to estimate a clear ending point. This may result in an inadequate policy action 
being undertaken to meet a rule, as the desirable policy response ensuring macroeconomic 
consistency would require a different policy. A potential remedy to this problem would be to 
target a cyclically-adjusted budget deficit on an annual basis because it would allow automatic 
stabilisers to come into effect. However, as mentioned above, the concept of cyclical adjustment 
would  play  a  crucial  role  in  setting  fiscal  policy,  and  given  the  limited  precision  of  cyclical 
estimations the role for such a solution is rather limited. 
Deficit  rules  are  sometimes  criticised  for  “encouraging  creative  accounting  and  other 
detrimental practices to transparency” (Hemming and Kell, 2001). Remedies may be to apply 
internationally recognised and comparable accounting standards and classifications as well as 
independent scrutiny of their execution. 
 
1.2.2. Debt rules 
 
A debt rule is a constraint usually imposed on the debt-to-GDP ratio that should be met 
within a predefined period of time. Appropriate measurement of the public debt is a crucial issue 
in practical terms for setting and executing fiscal targets. There is a question mark over whether 
net or gross debt should be applied. The former includes assets owned by the government that 
can  be  sold,  but  the  issue  of  proper  valuation  arises.  The  latter  is  a  widely  used  and 
internationally comparable measure, although it is not entirely efficient when assessing fiscal 
sustainability. Another element is to choose between face values and market prices of debts and 
assets. Face values are more commonly used by governments, as market prices are volatile and Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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may  reflect  a  temporarily  unfavourable  situation  in  the  financial  markets.  However,  market 
participants tend to prefer employing market values in their analysis. 
A very important concept in the context of debt rules and targets is maximum sustainable 
government debt. Theory has yet to come up with a widely accepted and operationally useful 
approach, however. An influential paper by Barro (1979) claims that the debt ratio should be 
constant. Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) conclude, based on dynamic optimal tax models with 
exogenous growth, that debt should decrease over time to levels set by initial conditions. The 
model with endogenous growth by Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998) suggests that debt should 
be negative over the long term. Rankin and Roffia (2003) employ the two-period overlapping 
generational model proposed by Diamond (1965). The authors show under which conditions 
maximum  sustainable  government  debt  can  be  achieved  in  both  a  closed  and  an  open 
economy. They also provide a thorough analysis of stability conditions. Rankin and Roffia show 
that  a  steady  state  maximum  sustainable  interest-inclusive  debt  leads  to  the  occurrence  of 
greater crowding out effects in comparison with the steady state related to interest-exclusive 
debt.
1 
The determination of optimal debt remains a challenging question for theory, which in 
conjunction with the welfare-enhancing effects of fluctuations in debt allows one to conclude that 
a debt ceiling may be superior to a point-target (Hemming and Kell, 2001). The authors are in 
favour of a combination of both path and ceiling, as this offers an adequate mixture of flexibility 
and credibility.  
 
1.2.3. Expenditure rules 
 
This is a constraint imposed on expenditures in a form of a ceiling or spending limits. 
They may vary substantially from one country to another in form.
2 
Hemming  and Kell (2001)  analyse the  advantages  and  disadvantages of  expenditure 
rules.  There  are  three  main  advantages,  they  suggest.  Firstly,  they  impose  pressure  on 
politicians to  consider  budgetary  constraint  when  setting fiscal  parameters. This  also makes 
government more accountable because expenditures can be controlled as opposed to deficits 
depending  to  a  large  extent  on  economic  performance.  Secondly,  they  are  very  simple  to 
understand by the participants of the budgetary process and more widely in society. It is also 
much  easier  to  monitor  them  than  cyclically-adjusted  deficits.  Finally,  the  expenditure  rules 
                                                 
1 Interest-exclusive debt is the outstanding value of government liabilities at the beginning of any period, 
whereas interest-inclusive debt includes current interest payments (Rankin and Roffia, 2003).  
2 A detailed discussion can be found in Hemming and Kell (2001) Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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enhance robust fiscal policy and allow automatic stabilisers to work. There are also drawbacks 
corresponding to expenditure rules. Firstly, politicians tend to spend as much as is allowed by 
the ceilings even in the context of favourable economic conditions. Secondly, they may not be 
sufficient to ensure surpluses during prosperity periods. 
 
1.3. Empirical research 
 
Following Kennedy et al. (2001), empirical research on fiscal rules can be broadly divided 
into  four  areas.  Firstly,  there  is  the  question  as  to  whether  fiscal  policy  rules  are  effective. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of the rules can be analysed with respect to different types of rules 
i.e. deficit rules, debt limits and expenditure rules. Thirdly, it is important to investigate the extent 
to which fiscal rules are constraints for any government’s counter-cyclical policy. Finally, the role 
of political and budgetary institutions, along with fiscal consolidation, is discussed. 
Poterba (1996, 1997) addresses the crucial question of the effectiveness of the rules. He 
analyses the importance of balanced budget constraints in the US and concludes that budget 
rules and related fiscal institutions have an impact on fiscal performance. From a different angle 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994) investigate the effectiveness of rules, examining how fiscal 
rules affect interest costs. They conclude that by imposing expenditure and tax limits the interest 
costs are diminished. Poterba and Rueben (1999) confirm this with respect to expenditure limits, 
but  provide  different results  for  tax  limits.  They  claim  that  the  introduction  of  tax  limits may 
reduce the government’s ability to service its debt in the form of bonds. 
Empirical  research  also  investigates  how  different  type  of  fiscal  rules  affects  overall 
effectiveness. Poterba (1994) concludes that the more restrictive expenditure and tax rules are 
the faster fiscal adjustments to unexpected deficits occur. The results obtained by von Hagen 
(1991) suggest that the application of both debt rules and balanced budgets have distributional 
effects on per capita state debt, the share of debt to GDP and the ratio of non-guaranteed to 
guaranteed debt in those states that have adopted restrictive measures. Another of von Hagen’s 
conclusions is that balanced budget rules may be associated with creative accounting. This is 
not, however, confirmed by a study undertaken by Bohn and Inman (1996). Their results show 
that the adoption of more stringent rules tends to lead to better fiscal performance of states. The 
study also indicates that constitutional rules are preferable to statutory rules. 
Another line of research is concerned with the impact of rules on the ability of fiscal policy 
to reduce the fluctuations that are part of the business cycle. Results obtained by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1995) show that states that apply restrictive fiscal rules tend to be characterised Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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by lower cyclical variability. However, the study by Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) indicates that 
this tends not to be accompanied by increased variability of output at the state level. Levinson 
(1998)  criticises  Alesina  and  Bayoumi’s  analysis  on  the  grounds  that  they  do  not  take  into 
account those features of states that may not be fully observable. He points out that the size of a 
state  is  a  variable  linked  to  business  cycle  fluctuations  and  also  discovers  that  stringent 
balanced budget rules tend to increase business cycle fluctuations. 
   Another  strand  of  the  empirical  literature  is  devoted  to  the  role  of  political  systems, 
budgetary  institutions  and  fiscal  consolidation.  An  important  contribution  has  been  made  by 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999), who argue, based on the dataset for EU countries, that a 
principal issue is either delegation of power to a strong finance minister or setting negotiated 
expenditure targets. Arreaza et al. (1999) extend this further, showing that in countries which 
adopt either a delegation of power approach or negotiated expenditure targets the government 
can smooth consumption easier than otherwise would be possible. The question of the level of 
government involvement in the context of fiscal rules is raised by Corsetti and Roubini (1996). 
They argue that fiscal rules should be applied at the intra-national level rather than at national 
level. A similar view is presented by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995). 
 
 1.4. Discussion 
 
The issue of fiscal transparency has been examined theoretically in the literature. The 
central  conclusion  appears  to  be  that  the  higher  the  degree  of  transparency  the  higher  the 
potential benefits in terms of greater fiscal discipline and more accountable fiscal policy. Other 
benefits are related to reduction of uncertainty in fiscal policy and faster and smoother fiscal 
policy responses to shocks hitting the economy. Empirical research confirms the positive impact 
of transparency on fiscal performance.  
Transparency  can  be  a  powerful  supplementary  tool  when  setting  and  subsequently 
executing fiscal rules that are primarily introduced to gain credibility. This is particularly important 
for  countries  that  seek  to  inject  or  restore  credibility  when  initialising  a  reform  package  or 
following a crisis. An optimal solution to adopting fiscal rules seems to be a cyclically-adjusted 
deficit  alongside  a  debt  ceiling  and  path  that  would  be  accompanied  by  a  ceiling  for 
expenditures. Empirical results tend to favour fiscal rules. However, in order to fully benefit from 
such rules fiscal policy has to be transparent, as this imposes pressure on policymakers to be 
accountable. The issue of accountability can act as an important tool for politicians in pursuing a 
disciplined fiscal policy. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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2. Analytical framework 
 
The main objective of this section is to set out a basic framework for the analysis of fiscal 
rules in the context of transparency, which is presented in the subsequent sections. The section 
starts with a review of basic fiscal accounting and analyses the stability of debt. This is followed 
by an exposition of the basic fiscal policy rules. Finally, the key points for fiscal policy conduct 
are broached within the framework outlined above. 
2.1. Rudimentary fiscal arithmetic 
 
The analytical framework we employ in our study is based upon a partial equilibrium 
setup. The generic formula involves the government budget constraint that can be expressed as 
an unstable non-homogenous difference equation 
 
( ) t t t t T G D r D − + + = −1 1                 (1) 
 
where D is level of debt, G government expenditures, T tax revenues, and r interest rate.  
 
Equation (1) informs us that the primary budget deficit can be financed by issuing new 
debt.
3 Multiplying out the expression in the brackets and suppressing the time subscripts yields 
 
rD T G D + − = ∆                   (2) 
 


















                  (3) 
 
                                                 
3 It is assumed that monetary financing of the budget deficit is omitted due to the negligible effect of 
seigniorage in NMS in the second half of the 1990s (Cukrowski and Janecki, 2004), otherwise the formula 
would be extended to the following  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 − − − − − + + = t t t t t t t M M T G D r D where M is money supply. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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  and  rearranging  and  substituting  (5)  into  (3)  yields  the  following 
expression 
 
( )d y r t g d − + − = ∆                   (6) 
 
This is a difference equation that determines the dynamics of debt ratio i.e. how debt evolves 
over time. 
We subsequently assume that in equilibrium 0 = ∆d and then rearrange (6) which yields 
 
( )d y r t g − + − = 0                   (7) 
 








= 0                     (8) 
 








*                     (9) 
 
The sign of the debt ratio is not determined a priori. It depends on the sign of the budget 
balance, t g − , and the sign of the difference between the growth rate and interest rate, r y− . If 
the fraction in equation (9) is characterised by the same sign in the numerator and denominator 
then the government, to be in equilibrium, needs to hold private sector financial assets. If the 
signs are different, the government is a creditor to the private sector. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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2.2. Basic fiscal rules 
 
The  previous subsection  presents  government budget constraints and derives  a  debt 
ratio ensuring stability. It is important to discuss the conditions that have to be satisfied in order 
to keep debt stable. We follow Carlin and Soskice (2005) in formulating a setting for fiscal rules 
based on a partial equilibrium framework.
4 
The  government  budget  constraints  in  terms  of  ratios  to  GDP  can  be  recalled  from 
equation (6).  
 
( )d y r t g d − + − = ∆                   (10) 
 
This expression shows that the accumulation of debt is shaped by a primary deficit and 
the difference between interest rates and economic growth. Under these conditions the stability 
of debt can be achieved at any ratio, therefore we stick to the Maastricht criterion requiring the 
debt ratio not to exceed 60 percent of GDP.
5 If we want to prevent the debt ratio from increasing, 







≤                     (11) 
 
where bars denote long-term values. Assuming a certain path of expenditures the question of 
financing arises. Recalling the equation (10) and the solvency condition gives 
 
( )d y r g t − + ≥                   (12) 
 
Subsequently, setting government revenues from taxes at the long-term level 
* t and equating 
this to equation (12) yields a fiscal rule. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]d y y r r g g d − − − + − ≤ ∆               (13) 
 
We can interpret as follows: that a government wanting to increase its expenditures over 
long-term values can temporarily  do  so by  borrowing.  The  rule implies,  however,  that  if  the 
                                                 
4 Analysis based on the general equilibrium framework can be found, inter alia, in studies by Buiter (2001), 
Buiter and Grafe (2003), and Annicchiarico and Giammarioli (2004).  
5  It is to a large extent an arbitrary number, but since we want to analyse the case of Poland this is a 
binding constraint. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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interest rate is higher than its long-term values over the temporary horizon or if economic growth 
is lower than its long-term values then the debt is allowed to increase. This is because the rule 
allows for an increase in the budget deficit, which in turn leads to debt accumulation. On the 
other  hand,  if  the  government  increases  expenditures  permanently  then  this  should  be 




In order to work appropriately the fiscal rule presented above has to be supplemented by 
a high degree of transparency in fiscal policy with respect to predictions for interest rates and 
economic growth. The importance of transparency is also emphasised by Carlin and Soskice 
(2004).  In  addition,  the  medium-term  macroeconomic  framework  to  be  pursued  by  the 
government and unveiled to the general public is another precondition because variables such 
as inflation and exchange rates can also be included as government budget constraints. This 
would allow one to assess the consistency of assumed fiscal policy in the broader context of 
macroeconomic policy.  
 
3. Fiscal transparency and rules in Poland 
3.1. Fiscal policy in Poland over the transition period 
 
Robust economic growth in the first years of Poland’s post-communist transition made it 
possible to maintain a balanced budget at a relatively safe level. During the 1990’s the central 
government  deficit  was  reduced  from  6.5%  of  GDP  (1991-1992)  to  about  3%  of  GDP 
between1993-1996 and to 2% of GDP subsequently. Public debt was also reduced, from about 
90% of GDP in 1990.
6 In the first years of the transition the Paris and London Clubs agreed to 
write  off  a  significant  part  of  Poland’s  foreign  debt.  This  operation  also  resulted  in  Poland 
regaining  the  credit  capacity  it  had  lost  at  the  end  of  the  1970’s,  when  the  communist 
government refused to servicing its excessive debt.  
Poland’s  fiscal  policy  stance  started  to  deteriorate  in  1999.  The  general  government 
deficit increased to 3% of GDP, despite a decrease in the central government deficit, due to 
growing lending by off-budget institutions. This took place after the implementation of four key 
                                                 
6 Foreign debt was incurred in the 1970’s when successive communist governments borrowed to finance 
unsuccessful manufacturing sector reforms.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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reforms of public sector institutions (i.e. the pension system, health service, local administration 
and education). Low economic growth between 2001 and 2002 resulted in a further deterioration 
in the fiscal position. In the pre-accession period Poland was also one of the central and eastern 
European countries to relax its fiscal policy. Consequently, between 2000 and 2004 the general 
government deficit increased from 3.0% to 6.3% of GDP. This was accompanied by a drop in 
privatisation  revenues,  which  tend  to  be  used  as  an  alternative  to  Treasury  securities  as  a 
means of covering public sector borrowing requirements. This caused a significant acceleration 
of public debt from 2002 onwards. In 2003 public debt exceed the first threshold laid out in the 
Act on Public Finance (a ratio of 50% debt-to-GDP), and in 2004 stabilised slightly below the 
second threshold (55% debt-to-GDP). 
There  is  a  wide  range  of  factors  explaining  such  considerable  fiscal  deterioration 
between 1999 and 2004. The unfavourable fiscal performance may in large part be attributable 
to delayed costs of the reforms undertaken earlier in the 1990’s. Other factors were also the 
electoral  cycle  and  economic  slowdown.  Additionally,  a  cross-European  country  comparison 
shows that fiscal policy was relaxed across the Central European new member states, whereas 
the Baltic countries improved their fiscal stance. The fiscal performance of central European 
countries  can  be  treated  as  the  outcome  in  many  ways  of  deliberate  political-economic 
decisions, which are in turn largely dependent on the expected benefits to be derived from a 
tighter or looser fiscal stance.
7 
At the beginning of the 1990’s Poland underwent significant structural reforms with the 
implementation  of  market  economic  rules.  This  was  manifested  in  acceleration  of  economic 
restructuring and a significant decrease in employment, amongst other things. The social costs 
of these reforms were partially offset by easy access to a wide range of social transfers. This, 
combined with widening indexation of budget spending, resulted in a significant increase in the 
structural deficit of the Polish budget. Consequently, economic slowdown, which started in 2000, 
revealed the structural problems inherent in Poland’s public finances. It should also be noted 
that the reforms of the Polish public sector were significantly delayed compared to the wider 
economic restructuring process. Thus, the poor condition of public institutions in fact reinforced 
the underlying problems of the Polish budget in the years of economic slowdown. In 1999 the 
Polish government implemented key public sector reforms, but this added to the deteriorating 
condition of the country’s public finance due to the high initial costs of the changes. Its positive 
aspects will only be visible in the longer term (for example reforms of the pension system).  
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Another key factor explaining the significant deterioration in public finances since the 
1990’s is Poland’s electoral cycle. The 2001 elections and the political competition that preceded 
it in effect forced the government to prepare a budget that significantly increased spending, 
including  in  certain  legally  statutory  areas  and  based  on  rather  unrealistically  favourable 
macroeconomic  assumptions.  Since  2001  the  budget  structure  has  changed  and  the  earlier 
balance between current spending and revenues abandoned. In 2001 the net lending of the 
general  government  exceeded  capital  spending,  which  meant  that  government  had  to  start 
borrowing to cover its current spending. 
Political constrains also reduced the possibility of implementing radical spending reforms 
in  the  subsequent  annual  budgets.  In  2004,  the  government  came  up  with  the  so-called 
‘Hausner  (austerity)  plan’
8,  but  parliament  watered  down  many  of  its  expenditure  cutting 
legislation, thus reducing any of the positive financial results that might have arisen from it.  
The macroeconomic environment has also had a strong impact on fiscal performance, 
with the pace of economic growth and level of inflation determining the tax base and thus, in 
turn, general government revenues. Due to the cyclical character of revenues the flexibility of 
expenditures is obliged to maintain the budget deficit at a sustainable level even in years of 
economic  slowdown.  The  significant  share  of  fixed  expenditures  in  Poland’s  central  budget 
further reinforced the deterioration in the fiscal stance between 2001-2002. 
In both pre- and post accession periods Poland failed to significantly tighten its fiscal 
policy. In 2004, Poland was one of six new member countries exceeding the SGP pact limit for 
the general government deficit. The first year of EU membership, which imposed an external 
anchor on the fiscal policies of the new member countries, appears not to have been effective 
stimuli to fiscal tightening, yet at least. The lack of fiscal consolidation can partially be attributed 
to the high cost of accession. Kopits and Szekely (2004) estimate that unless the new accession 
countries undertake major fiscal reforms the average direct budgetary cost of EU entry will widen 
the budget deficit by 3-4.75% of GDP. Furthermore, the stronger bargaining position of the new 
member  countries  may  be  seen  as  an  incentive  to  deviate  from  convergence  towards  the 
Maastricht criteria. As an additional factor explaining Poland’s low propensity to tighten its fiscal 
stance after accession one can also note the dilution of sanctions for failures to converge to the 
deficit reference values. This is combined with a decrease in the role played by the SGP after 
                                                 
8 The Hausner plan proposed spending cuts in the area of social appraisal and administrative costs. It also sought to 
increase public sector revenues by widening the tax base. The financial results of program were initially estimated at 
PLN 50 bn, but the majority of them would not be visible until after the 2005 election. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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unsuccessful attempts to impose economic sanctions on those EU member countries whose 





In the 1990’s Poland experienced considerable improvement in its fiscal transparency. 
Two important developments bringing the conduct of policy closer to international standards of 
transparency  were:  the  implementation  of  a  modern  budgeting  process  and  clarifying  the 
boundaries of the public sector. Since 1998 fiscal management has been based on the Act on 
Public  Finances,  which  comprehensively  defines  the  responsibilities  and  activities  of  the 
government.  Implementation  of  the  act  enforces  codified  budgets  and  a  far  more  stringent 
reporting process. It defines the use of budgetary reserves and provides for the imposition of 
sanctions for  non-compliance
10.  Finally,  the act  classifies  all  public  sector  units and  outlines 
financial management standards, as well as clarification of borrowing authority. 
The reforms undertaken in the 1990’s by other transition countries in the region were 
more advanced. This placed the conduct of Poland’s fiscal policy far behind the transparent 
practices  of  most  of  the  other  new  EU  members.  Considerable  improvement  in  terms  of 
transparency  practices  were  made  in  the  pre-accession  period  due  to  the  obligation  to 
implement  accountability  standards  as  a  condition  for  obtaining  EU  funds,  as  well  as  the 
implementation of more effective management to meet fiscal goals. 
The following assessment of fiscal transparency is based on the questionnaire proposed 
by  Allan  and  Perry.  The  questionnaire  was  constructed  by  modifying  the  IMF’s  observance 
standards in  order to  highlight four areas  that have particular  significance  for  EU  accession 
countries:  (i)  establishing  a  medium-term  budget  framework  (MTBF);  (ii)  comprehensive 
coverage of non-budgetary activities; (iii) effective accounting, reporting and oversight; and (iv) 
strengthening intergovernmental relations. The authors also added point (v), which is concerned 
with  audit functions  and  the MoF’s  role and  powers  in  the budgetary  process.  The index is 
included in the Appendix 1 to this work. 
As for the first of the above mentioned areas, transparency monitoring, one should note 
that Poland still has a deficiency in the budgeting process. This differentiates it significantly from 
the  standards  of  an  efficient  medium-term  budget  framework.  One  of  the  most  important 
weaknesses of the Polish budgeting process is the yearly outlook of its planning. This is contrary 
                                                 
9 A detailed discussion can be found in Berger et al. (2004) 
10 IMF, Report of Observance of Standards and Codes (2001) Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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to IMF recommendation, which propose the use of a medium-term framework or fiscal strategy 
to guide annual budget submissions. A yearly outlook does not allow any effectively links to be 
made  nor  credibly  budgeting  planning  with  medium-term  fiscal  policy  goals,  connected  for 
example with EU obligations. Additionally, budget planning should be strictly based on medium-
term  macroeconomic  projections.  This  makes  decision-makers  aware  of  revenue  shortages 
connected  with  the  economic  cycle  and  thus  allows  them  to  control  unrealistic  budget  bids. 
Poland’s budgeting process is based on macroeconomic projections. But since they cover only a 
single year this makes any proper evaluation of medium term macroeconomic risk connected, 
for example, with cyclical fluctuation of output, difficult. Both the above mentioned problems (lack 
of  long  term  fiscal  objectives  in  the  yearly  budget  and  insufficient  impact  of  medium  term 
macroeconomic estimates on the budget) would suggest that the budgeting process in Poland is 
still more affected by short-term policy aims than medium term objectives (for example fiscal 
targets connected with accession to the EMU). Consequently, the budget act outlines medium 
term goals only in general terms. The Polish budgeting process does not meet another feature 
of the MTBF, namely failing to make distinctions between new and ongoing policy costs. This 
undermines the establishment of accountability standards. On the positive side, there has been 
an increase in budgetary realism in recent years and periodically performed fiscal sustainability 
and long term risk analysis. 
In the second area of transparency monitoring, i.e. effective accounting, reporting and 
oversight, Poland‘s performance continues to improve. The defragmentation of the Polish public 
sector is still significant, although in recent years considerable attempts to consolidate the sector 
have  been  undertaken.  A  few  state  agencies  have  been  liquidated  and  other  state  offices 
consolidated into the government. Moreover, since 2004 a significant share of special funds 
have been included in the central budget. The MoF has started to move from a cash-based 
accounting classification (GFSM-1996) to an accrual-based system (GFSM-2001). The GFSM-
2001 system is consistent with the ESA-95 format, which became the main fiscal indicator after 
accession. 
In the third area of fiscal transparency, i.e. comprehensive coverage of non-budgetary 
activities, Poland has seen noticeable improvement. The MoF now includes in the yearly budget 
contingent liabilities and aims to limit quasi-fiscal activities (excluding still used government-held 
shares to recapitalize state-owned enterprises). However, on the negative side, to deteriorating 
fiscal transparency should be added difficulties with access to information on tax expenditures, 
which  are  generally  released  on  a  rather  ad  hoc  basis  and  thus  rarely  properly  or  fully 
scrutinised.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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In the fourth area, i.e. intergovernmental relations, it should be noted that the MoF has 
implemented a new classification of revenues, expenditures and foreign sources of financing, 
compatible with European regulations. Apart from developing an IT system of reporting for local 
government, this improves transparency standards in the area of intergovernmental relations. 
The last problem point in the fiscal transparency questionnaire covers audit functions and 
the  position  of  the  MoF  in  the  budgeting  process.  In  the  Polish  public  sector  there  exist 
institutions liable to external and internal audit. At the central government level external audits 
are performed by the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK). NIK inspects the accounts of central 
government and non-budget funds. It examines financial compliance with budgetary legislation. 
It should be noted that the institution is politically independent, which increases its credibility and 
its function. At the local government level external audit functions are performed by both NIK 
and regional clearing chambers. Inspections are effective, although there are some problems 
with execution of irregularities. The internal audit at both central and local government levels is 
provided by a systematically developing service. The internal audit programme was started in 
2001  and the  authorities have  systematically increased  the  number  of certified  auditors  and 
consequently control units cover an increasing number of public sector entities. 
The MoF has a dominant position in the central government budgeting process. The 
majority of public entities estimate their budgets based on expenditures limits, which they pass 
on to the MoF. Limits are based on total revenue projection and deficit limits to finance them. 
The impact of deficits on debt dynamics has been analysed especially in recent years when the 
risk of exceeding the constitutionally inscribed debt limit has increased. The impact of the MoF 
on the budgeting process also depends to a certain extent on public sector centralisation. In 
2004, a new law on public entities finance was passed, significantly increasing local government 
contributions to general government spending. However, local government are bound by fiscal 
rules that are more restrictive than for the central government. 
3.3.  Fiscal policy rules 
 
The  case  of  Poland  provides  impressive  examples  of  fiscal  policy  rules.  The  Polish 
constitution and Act on Public Finances impose debt and deficit rules. There are also examples 
of similar boundaries connected with external (European) obligations imposed on Poland. Some 
expenditure rules have also been introduced at hoc by the minister of finance (known as the 
‘Belka rule’).  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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3.3.1. Public debt rules 
 
Debt rules are the most rigid and effective. The first of them is the constitutional limit on 
public  debt,  including  warranties  and  guarantees,  stipulating  it  cannot  exceed  60%  of  GDP. 
However, the constitution does not contain a definition of public debt and refers to the Act on 
Public Finances. This gives plenty of room for interpretation in defining debt and can be seen as 
its main drawback. The second debt rule (in fact a group of rules) is included in the Act on Public 
Finances.  This  regulation  binds  the  government  to  stay  within  three  public  debt  thresholds. 
These are set to halt increases in borrowing restrictions for central and local governments when 
the public debt to GDP ratio exceeds them. The first limit is set at a ratio of 50% debt-to-GDP. 
Exceeding this level obliges central government to maintain a budget deficit-to-revenue ratio in 
the next year at the same level as in the year before. The same applies to local government. If 
public debt exceeds 55% of GDP the government is obliged to prepare the next year’s budget to 
be  in  balance,  which  necessarily  lowers  the  government’s  debt-to-GDP  ratio.  Moreover 
government is also obliged to present to parliament its fiscal consolidation program aimed at 
decreasing the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The thresholds for local government deficits have also 
been tightened. The last threshold is equal the constitutional limit for public debt (60% of GDP). 
The third debt limit is also compatible with Maastricht criteria. If public debt reaches or exceeds 
such  a  level,  the  next  year’s  budget  for  central  and  local  governments  must  be  balanced. 
Additionally,  warranties  and  guarantees  granted  by  public  sector  units  is  prohibited.  The 
government is also obliged to present to parliament a fiscal consolidation program aimed at 
reducing the public debt-to-GDP ratio.  
If debt exceeds the first threshold it has rather limited consequences for fiscal policy. An 
increase  of  debt  above  55%  of  GDP, which  to  some  extent  would  force  the  government  to 
balance central budget, would have a wider impact on central and local budgets. One of the 
main disadvantages of debt rules is the two-year delay between the date of breaching the debt 
limit and the obligation to implement a remedy. This is because official estimates of debt for year 
t are available in the second quarter of t+1 years.  
 
3.3.2. Deficit rules 
 
The  Polish  constitution  contains  a  clause  that  the  central  government  budget  deficit 
cannot  be  changed  without  parliamentary  approval.  Consequently,  the  government  tends  to Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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prepare a rather cautious forecast of revenues and expenditures in its budget projections. The 
government has also sometimes been forced to recourse to creative accounting procedures or 
allow excessive lending by non-budget institutions to reach previously envisaged deficit levels. 
This has usually taken place if the performance of revenues has been worse than assumed and 
stems largely from the high share of fixed expenditure in the budget. 
After its accession to the EU Poland has had to comply with SGP restrictions on its fiscal 
deficit. The pact states that the general government deficit cannot exceed 3% of GDP. If this 
level  is  breached  members  are  supposed  to  be  subject  to  excessive  deficit  procedures. 
Moreover, the threshold of 3% of GDP is also one of the convergence criteria and consequently 
appears as long term fiscal goal, given recent declarations made by the Polish authorities of 
their intention to enter EMU as quickly as possible. 
 
3.3.3. Expenditure rules 
 
Fiscal  policy in  Poland in recent years  also  provides  a  good  example  of  expenditure 
rules. In 2002, the then minister of finance Belka announced that the following year’s budgets 
would be prepared based on the assumption that central government expenditures would not 
increase by more than 1% above inflation. This set the path of fiscal policy in the subsequent 
years and was appreciated by the central bank and financial markets. However, the advantages 
of this rule strongly depend on its credibility. The experience of recent years shows that the rule 
has  been  less  obligatory  and  its  enforcement  largely  abandoned  by  post-Belka  ministers. 
Moreover, the rule only covers the central government deficit, which does not guarantee any 
decrease in the general government deficit due to a possible recourse to increase of excessive 
lending by off-budget units. 
3.4. Discussion 
 
Over  the  last  few  years  Poland  has  made  significant  progress  in  putting  fiscal 
transparency into practice. However, the most challenging areas for achieving IMF and the EU 
standards remain medium-term budgeting as well as accounting and data quality. 
The  most  important  benefits  in  terms  of  transparency  of  policy  in  Poland  would  be 
improvement of the fiscal management process, which would be especially beneficial on the 
convergence path. One of the most widely recommended changes in fiscal policy should be 
implementation  of  a  medium  term  budgeting  framework,  which  would  provide  compatibility Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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between  the  budgeting  process  and  medium term  fiscal  goals  (for  example,  included  in  the 
convergence reports). This would reinforce government attempts to meet fiscal convergence 
criteria and thus also increase credibility. Moreover, budget planning based on medium term 
macroeconomic projections would increase public finance stability if macroeconomic risk was 
included. 
Due to decentralisation of government activities, mainly by increasing the share of local 
budgets in the general government sector, compatible accounting and reporting systems should 
be established in order to effectively monitor fiscal risk and analyse sustainability. Moreover, 
establishing  a  new  law  on  local  government  revenues  increases  local  entities’  flexibility  and 
responsibility in the spending policy. Essential knowledge in the sphere of budgeting should be 
transferred  to  local  governments  in  order  to  avoid  fiscal  problems  similar  to  those  central 
government has experienced, when the first cyclical slowdown took place between 2001 and 
2002. 
The  fiscal  rules  presented  in  this  paper  distinguish  Poland  positively  among  central 
European countries in terms of protection from fiscal expansion. The most rigid are debt rules, 
which reduce risks of excessive borrowing and uncontrolled increases in debt servicing, which 
would result in constraining public spending or default. Debt rules constitute the ultimate limit for 
government borrowing, which become active when debt reaches a ceiling. Deficit rules should 
be treated as a current constraint for fiscal policy. On the one hand, over-rigid deficit rules in 
transition countries would cause additional turbulence for policy making due to high volatility of 
output. On the other hand, deficit rules, which are valid in Poland, do not guarantee essential 
and effective motivation for the government to maintain a healthy public stance. Regarding rules 
binding  local  government  one  should  note  that  they  are  strictly  more  rigid  than  for  central 
government. This could also lead to recourse to creative accounting by local government and 
this would suggest that internal and external audits, as well as implementation of comparable 
accounting and reporting methods, should be implemented. 
4. A proposal 
 
Fiscal policy targets that have to be achieved to fulfil fiscal convergence criteria have not 
yet been met in Poland. Although the implementation of rules has substantially bound fiscal 
policy to operate within the environment supporting necessary fiscal adjustment there seems to 
be much scope for further improvements. According to analysis by Allan and Perry (2003), as 
well  as  this  study,  the  current  stance  and  progress  in  fiscal  transparency  in  Poland  is  not 
adequate to the needs and requirements set by the EU and the IMF. Therefore, we propose the Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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formulation of an institutional framework to enhance the efficiency of transparency and fiscal 
rules in Poland. This in turn should result in superior fiscal performance over the longer-term. 
The  conclusion  considering  the  case  of  Poland  against  the  background  of  fiscal 
sustainability  poses  the  question  as  to  whether  the  introduction  of  an  Independent  Fiscal 
Authority  (IFA)  as  proposed  by  Ball  (1997)  and  Gruen  (1997)  might  be  a  remedy  for  fiscal 
prudence.  This is  of  course  the  most  extreme  solution  to  the  problem,  but  would  leave  the 
responsibility to the experts rather than to politics. On the other hand the sustainability of fiscal 
deficits ultimately depends on the level of debt accepted by voters. These might be in favour of a 
suspension of the fiscal rule, which would lead to the delay in the admission to the EMU, and 
most likely a damaged reputation. 
In our view, an intermediate step would be the full use of the prerogatives held by the 
NIK. This institution is entitled to inspect all central government accounts and non-budgetary 
funds and has the right to examine financial compliance with budgetary legislation. At the local 
government level audit functions are conducted by both the NIK and regional clearing chambers. 
One should note that the institution was granted full independence in 1994 and has since proved 
to  be  highly  successful  in  examining  public  finances.  The  remaining  problem  in  terms  of 
operational issues is the execution of irregularities, if and when found. The broad scope for 
NIK’s inspection measures should be supplemented by legislation that would allow examinations 
of  public  sector  institutions  also  with  respect  to  international  transparency  standards.  The 
institution  should  have  the  right  to  impose  financial  fines  on  public  sector  entities  for  not 
complying with the approved regulations. This could prevent politicians from employing creative 
accounting strategies in order to satisfy the Maastricht criteria as it was the case in Greece, Italy, 
and France (Easterly, 1999). 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The  issue  of  fiscal  transparency  has  been  theoretically  examined  in  the  literature, 
suggesting  that  a  higher  degree  of  transparency  is  fundamentally  associated  with  potential 
benefits in terms of greater fiscal discipline and more accountable fiscal policy. Other benefits 
are related to the reduction of uncertainty over the conduct of fiscal policy, as well as to earlier 
and smoother fiscal policy responses to shocks hitting the economy. Empirical results tend to 
confirm a positive impact of transparency on fiscal performance in developed countries.  
Transparency  can  be  a  powerful  supplementary  tool  when  setting  and  subsequently 
executing  fiscal  rules  that  are  primarily  introduced  to  gain  credibility.  This  seems  to  be 
particularly important for countries that would like to inject or restore credibility when initialising a Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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reform package or following a crisis. An optimal solution to adopting fiscal rules seems to be 
cyclically-adjusted  deficits,  along  with  both  a  ceiling  and  path  for  debt  that  would  be 
accompanied by a ceiling for expenditures. Although the concept of a cyclically-adjusted deficit 
seems to be very relevant (the one allowing automatic stabilisers to work), certain technical 
difficulties with appropriate evaluation do arise. Empirical results are generally in favour of fiscal 
rules. However, in order to fully benefit from rules fiscal policy has to be transparent, as this 
obliges policymakers to become more accountable. The issue of accountability can act as an 
important tool for policymakers to pursue a disciplined fiscal policy. 
Although  substantial  improvements  have  been  made  in  Poland  with  respect  to  fiscal 
transparency standards set by the EU and other international organisations there is still much 
scope for enhancement. The element of fiscal transparency that should be made significantly 
better is broadly defined improvement in the fiscal management process. The recommended 
change in fiscal policy would involve the implementation of medium-term budgetary framework 
that would ensure consistency between the budgetary process and medium-term fiscal goals. 
This would in turn reinforce the government’s attempt to satisfy fiscal convergence criteria and 
consequently increase its credibility in the financial markets. Furthermore, budgetary planning 
based  upon  medium-term  macroeconomic  projections  would  enhance  the  stability  of  public 
finance  if  macroeconomic  risks  were  included.  Another  important  issue  is  the  compatible 
accounting  and  reporting  system  at  both  national  and  intra-national  level  that  should  be 
established  in  order  to  monitor  fiscal  risk  effectively  and  analyse  sustainability.  Yet  another 
change  to  implement  would  be  to  transfer  know-how  on  budgetary  issues  from  central 
government to local governments.  
The  applied  fiscal  rules  distinguish  Poland  positively  from  other  central  European 
countries in terms of protection from fiscal expansion. The most rigid of them is the debt rule, 
although  it  can  be  argued  that  it  has  prevented  Poland  from  excessive  borrowing  and  an 
uncontrolled  increase  in  debt.  The  deficit  rule  could  induce  some  higher  volatility  of  output, 
although fiscal policy with respect to the targeted deficit has not been particularly successful in 
recent years. The rule does not guarantee essential and effective motivation for the government 
to maintain sustainable public finances. The expenditure rule was introduced for just a short 
period of time, therefore it is not possible to assess its efficiency. In our view, however, the rule 
should be reintroduced to strengthen fiscal discipline, as it could force policymakers to tighten 
fiscal policy. It seems to be indispensable to maintain fiscal rules at the local government level. 
Although  they  are  even  more  rigid  than  the  central  government  by  the  issue  of  creative 
accounting arises in this context.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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The  issue  of  still  limited  fiscal  transparency  and  unsatisfactory  performance  of  fiscal  rules 
requires  the  undertaking  of  various  appropriate  measures  to  strengthen  the  fiscal  policy 
framework in Poland. This can be done in our view by involving external institution entitled to 
examine  fiscal  transparency  and  the  performance  of  fiscal  rules  thoroughly  more  in  the 
budgetary  process. We think  that the institution that  is fully  capable  to  take the lead in  this 
respect is the NIK, which was granted full independence in 1994 and has since proved to highly 
successful  in  overseeing  public  finances.  This  should,  however,  be  accompanied  by 
simultaneous enhancement of the internal audit. 
 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
 




Questionnaire  based  on  the  IMF  Reports  on  Standards  and  Codes  for  Fiscal 
Transparency and own concepts 
 
Medium-term Budgeting and Analysis           
realistic annual budget              1 
budget documents include forward year estimates        1 
medium-term macro framework guides annual budget process    0.5 
budget documents include medium-term objectives       0.5 
new and ongoing policy costs are distinguished in the budget    0 
medium term estimates guide annual budget submissions      0 
analysis of fiscal sustainability/long term risks        0.5 
 
Accounting and Data Quality 
budget coverage: inclusion of extrabudgetary funds       0.5 
budget/accounts broadly consistent with GFSM2001      0.5 
accounts with some accrual information          0.5 
 
Off-budget fiscal activity 
contingent liabilities are reported in the budget        1 
quasi fiscal operations are limited            1 
data on tax expenditures is published            0 
 
Intergovernmental relations 
limits or controls on local government debt and borrowing      0.5 
uniform classification for general government        1 
 
Audit and the position of MoF 
independent audit of the central budget          0.5 
the relative importance of MoF over spending ministries       0.5 
in the budgetary process             
yes – 1 
if yes, but unsatisfactorily – 0.5 
no – 0 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 327 - Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland 
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